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Abstract— Business and social life have become increasingly
dependent on large-scale communication and information sys-
tems. A partial or complete breakdown as a consequence of
natural disasters or purposeful attacks might have severe impacts.
Survivability refers to the ability of a system to recover from such
disaster circumstances. Evaluating survivability should therefore
be an important part of communication system design. In this
paper we take a model checking approach toward assessing
survivability. We use the logic CSL to phrase survivability in
a precise manner. The system operation is modelled through
a labelled CTMC. Model checking algorithms can then decide
automatically whether the system is survivable. We illustrate our
method by evaluating the survivability of the Google file system
using stochastic Petri nets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many parts of everyday life depend heavily on large-scale
communication and information systems. It is therefore essen-
tial for such systems to survive catastrophic events. However,
the concept of survivability is not restricted to this type of
technical system. It is also known for military devices, for
example, aircraft combat survivability, and even in agriculture
[1].
The literature is abundant with different definitions of
survivability. For an overview see for example [2], [3]. Distinct
definitions stress different aspects of survivability, be it the
detection of faults, the defence against attacks or the recovery
from various types of disasters. The definition we will use
throughout this paper focuses on the behaviour of a system
after a disaster has occurred. Note that we do not introduce a
new definition of survivability but state a slightly generalised
version of the one in [4]; it reflects an intuitively appealing
view on survivability of communication systems but is there-
fore also quite imprecise:
Survivability is the ability of a system to recover
predefined service levels in a timely manner after
the occurrence of disasters.
A disaster might be any kind of severe disturbance of the
communication system, for example, a power breakdown or
the complete or partial cut of communication lines. The
possible causes are manifold and include purposeful attacks
as well as natural disasters like earthquakes or thunderstorms.
A system is survivable if it includes mechanisms to return
to normal service within an acceptable time even though a
disaster occurred. What kind of mechanisms are used and
how they are implemented is not part of the survivability
definition. One possible mechanism to achieve survivability
is fault tolerance [5].
The above definition of survivability does not give at all a
precise recipe how to decide whether a system is survivable or
not. To overcome this, many approaches have been followed in
the literature for the quantitative determination of survivability
[3], [6]–[9]. Most of them are model-based and suggest
some measure on the system (model) behaviour and study its
evolution after the occurrence of a disaster. It, thus, is the
deliberate decision of the person performing the survivability
evaluation to choose an appropriate measure.
In [3], [7] the system model is a continuous-time Markov
chain (CTMC). CTMCs have a long history in practical model-
based performance and dependability evaluation [10]. Despite
their stochastic nature it is still quite simple to compute
measures for this class of models.
The goal of this paper is to show a more direct and precise
method for the quantitative evaluation of survivability by using
a model-checking approach. Designated properties are phrased
in a formal but simple logic. There is a variety of logics
to choose from; we opt for the continuous stochastic logic
(CSL) [11], [12]. With this logic we can describe survivability
following the intuitive definition closely, including the quan-
titative aspects. In doing so, it is not necessary to rely on
an arbitrary measure as an indicator for survivability. After
building a CTMC model of the system under consideration
and after specifying survivability in the logic CSL, one can
apply standard model checking algorithms. These algorithms
determine automatically, whether the model has the survivabil-
ity property or not. Complete tools for model checking CSL
properties against CTMCs exist [13], [14]. For more general
models the model checking approach is also suitable but in
most of these cases computationally less attractive [15]. For a
general overview of the model checking approach see [16].
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next
section is dedicated to labelled CTMCs. We also introduce
a simple example which serves as illustration throughout the
remainder. The logic CSL is explained informally in Section
III. In Section IV we show how we can phrase survivability
in terms of CSL and give results for the illustrating example.
Section V assesses the survivability of the Google file system
[17]. This scalable file system is especially designed to support
large data-intensive applications, primarily the Google search
engines. We study its behaviour under disaster conditions.
Section VI completes this paper by presenting conclusions and
referring to future work.
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II. CTMC MODELS FOR SURVIVABILITY
A CTMC C = (S,R) consists of a discrete state space S
which we assume to be finite and a rate matrix R : S × S →
R≥0. Whenever R(s, s′) > 0, we say that there is a transition
between s and s′. The delay of a transition from state s to s′ is
governed by an exponential distribution, that is, 1−e−R(s,s′)·t
is the probability that the transition takes place within t units
of time if s′ is chosen to be the successor state of s. E(s) =∑
s′∈SR(s, s
′) is the total outgoing rate of state s, such that
1 − e−E(s)·t is the probability of leaving s within t units of
time. The probability of taking a particular outgoing transition
within t units of time is given by (1−e−E(s)·t)·R(s, s′)/E(s).
CTMCs are enhanced with state labels in order to make
them more meaningful and understandable and to allow the
formulation of properties of states. Formally, labels are drawn
from a set AP of so-called atomic propositions. Each element
of AP represents a state property that should not be composed
of other properties in any manner. A labelled CTMC M =
(C, L) consists then of a CTMC C = (S,R) and a labelling
function L : S → 2AP that assigns each state a set of atomic
propositions.
A sequence of states together with the time spent in each
state (a so-called path) is able to represent the behaviour of
the CTMC over time. A probability space over sets of paths
starting in the same state can be defined [12], [18]. Sets of
paths are assigned probabilities by taking into account the state
sojourn times and the transitions taken. Taking into account all
possible paths, one can determine for each state the transient
probability at a given time t, that is, the probability of residing
in this state at time t.
Observing the transient probabilities for t →∞, one arrives
at the steady-state probabilities. For each state, this is the
probability of residing in it “on the long run.” Note that, in
general, transient and steady-state probabilities do depend on
the starting state.
Example 1 (A Telecommunication switching system): As a
running example we work with a simple availability model
of a telecommunication switching system, adapted from [3],
with n = 25 channels (cf. Figure 1). Incoming calls arrive
following a Poisson process with rate λ. An incoming call
changes the state of one line from idle to busy. If there is no
idling channel left, the call is lost. The call holding times are
exponentially distributed with parameter μ. Channels may fail
due to internal reasons. Channel failures affect the availability
of the system. Channel failures as such are not to be equated
with disasters, which are more catastrophic events induced by
external influence. On the average, each channel fails every
1/γ units of time, hence, the overall failure rate is proportional
to the number of working channels. The failure of an active
channel causes the loss of the corresponding call. Channel
repair (regardless of the cause of failure) takes on average
1/τ units of time.
The overall behaviour of this system, including call arrivals
and services, as well as channel failures and repairs, can be
modelled as a CTMC. A state of this CTMC is identified as
a pair (i, j), where i denotes the number of calls present and
j is the number of working channels (with i ≤ j). Figure 2
shows the CTMC.
1
2
n
λ
μ
Fig. 1. Simple model of a telephone switch with n channels.
As atomic propositions we define
AP = {i calls present, i channels up | i ∈ {0, . . . , n}},
and label state (i, j) with
L((i, j)) = {i calls present, j channels up} .
III. INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO CSL
In this section we give an informal overview over the
language CSL. For a formal definition of its syntax and
semantics, see [12].
CSL state formulas describe properties the states of a
labelled CTMC might have. If a state has the property that
is represented by a state formula Φ, it satisfies Φ and we say
that it is a Φ-state. The set of all Φ-states is denoted Sat(Φ).
The simplest CSL state formulas are true and false. Every
state of a labelled CTMC satisfies true, not a single state
satisfies false.
The state labels in a labelled CTMC come from a set of
atomic propositions AP . Each such atomic proposition is also a
CSL state formula. An atomic proposition is satisfied by a state
if the state is labelled with this atomic proposition. For our
running example, 20 channels up and 16 calls present
are valid CSL state formulas.
Furthermore, any boolean connection (conjunction, nega-
tion, implication, etc.) of state formulas is again a
state formula. Their interpretation with respect to satisfac-
tion is straightforward. For example, 20 channels up ∧
16 calls present is satisfied by state (16, 20) and not by
any other state (cf. Figure 2).
Another possibility for a CSL state formula is to refer
to the steady-state probabilities of a specified set of states.
Let Φ be an arbitrary state formula, and let π(s, Sat(Φ))
be the sum of the steady-state probabilities of residing in
states contained in Sat(Φ), after having started in state s.
Let ∈ {<,≤,≥, >} be a comparison operator and let p ∈
[0, 1] be a probability. Then state s satisfies the steady-state
formula Sp(Φ) if π(s, Sat(Φ))  p, that is, the steady-
state probability of all Φ-states must meet the bound given
by  p. In the running example, this accumulated steady-
state probability of being in a 16 calls present-state is
0.1019. This probability is obtained by solving for the steady-
state probabilities of the CTMC and summing the steady-state
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Fig. 2. CTMC of the illustrating example.
probabilities for the states that satisfy this property. Note that,
here, this probability is the same for any starting state s. So,
every state of the labelled CTMC satisfies the steady-state
formula S≥0.1(16 calls present).
About the next step of the labelled CTMC one can reason
with a next formula Pp(X≤tΦ). With t ∈ R≥0 a time
bound, a state satisfies the next formula if the probability of
performing exactly one transition into a Φ-state before t units
of time have passed meets the bound  p. For example,
P≥0.7(X
≤0.2 sec 20 channels up)
is satisfied by those states for which the probability of stepping
into a state where 20 channels are up within 0.2 seconds is at
least 70%. A simple computation (not shown here) reveals that
this formula is satisfied by states (4, 20), (5, 20), . . . , (19, 20).
The most involved formula is the until formula
Pp(Φ1 U
≤tΦ2). It constraints the probability of moving
along Φ1-states and finally reaching a Φ2-state before t units
of time have passed. As an example, consider the following
formula:
P>0.01(16 calls present U
≤2 sec 20 channels up).
A state satisfies this formula if the probability of moving only
along states where 16 calls are present and reaching a state
where exactly 20 channels are up within 2 seconds is bigger
than 1%. An arbitrary number (even zero) of intermediate
transitions is allowed. The formula holds trivially in all states
(i, 20) for i = 0, . . . , 20, because these states satisfy the “goal”
formula 20 channels up. Additionally, a transient analysis,
following the procedure in [12], reveals that the formula also
holds in state (16, 19).
To ease notation we give names to formulas that subse-
quently may act as formulas themselves. For example,
all channels up ≡ n channels up,
all channels down ≡ 0 channels up,
no capacity ≡
n∨
i=1
(i calls present
∧ i channels up).
IV. EXPRESSING SURVIVABILITY USING CSL
It is a design decision whether to include the possible
occurrence of disasters into the model or not [9]. For a given-
occurrence-of-disaster (GOOD) model, there are no transitions
in the CTMC that correspond to the incidence of a disaster.
In such systems a disaster is such a rare event that we can
not include its occurrence in the model appropriately. We
simply assume that an external disaster has happened and start
our observation just after its occurrence, that is, we set the
starting conditions (probabilities) such as if a disaster has just
happened. On the other hand, random-occurrence-of-disaster
(ROOD) models include transitions that indicate the incidence
of disasters. Both approaches are discussed below, in Sections
IV-A and IV-B, respectively. In Section IV-C we generalise
the concept of survivability to multiple levels of disaster and
service.
A. Survivability for GOOD models
Recall the intuitive definition of survivability:
Survivability is the ability of a system to recover
predefined service levels in a timely manner after
the occurrence of disasters.
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Below we will phrase the constituent ingredients of surviv-
ability as CSL formulas. Putting the formulas together in a
suitable manner, we will end up with a global CSL formula
describing survivability.
Disaster states: First of all we shape up a CSL state
formula describing those states of our system model that are
disaster states, that is, states that will be occupied just after
a disaster has occurred. We may choose whatever we feel is
suitable in the given context.
For our illustrating example, we set
disaster ≡ all channels down,
that is, the system model is in a disaster state if all channels
are down. Note that the cause of the disaster does not play
a role here. Only state (0, 0) satisfies this formula, the single
one in the last row in Figure 2.
Service states: For the specification of states providing a
predefined service level we specify also a CSL formula. For
our example we assume that the predefined level of service is
only attained if all n channels are up and working:
service ≡ all channels up.
This formula is satisfied by the states in the first row of
Figure 2.
Recoverability: The definition of survivability requires
the system “to recover predefined service levels in a timely
manner.” CSL until formulas allow us to precisely phrase this
requirement: the system has to reach a service state before a
given time t. The logic forces us to wrap it into a probability
constraint. For a given time bound t and a given probability
p, the corresponding CSL until formula reads
recoverability ≡ P≥p(true U
≤tservice).
We can abbreviate (true U≤tservice) by (♦≤tservice)
(“eventually”). Hence, a state is recoverable if the probability
of reaching a service state before t units of time have elapsed
is at least p. If we want recoverability in any possible case we
set p = 1.
Survivability: We now have defined CSL specifications
for all the ingredients that make up survivability: survivability,
finally, requires that any disaster state is also recoverable. This
can easily be phrased as a CSL state formula for survivability:
survivability ≡ disaster ⇒ recoverability. (1)
All non-disaster states satisfy the survivability property triv-
ially (because of the implication). If this formula is also
satisfied by all disaster states of a system, we say that the
system is survivable. Note that the disaster formula is not
bound to describe the “worst” states of the system. We might
purposely ignore really bad states, for example, because we
already know they can never be recoverable.
Example 2 (Survivability for the Switching System): For
the illustrating example, the survivability formula becomes
survivability ≡ all channels down (2)
⇒ P≥p
(
♦≤tall channels up
)
.
All states besides (0, 0) trivially satisfy the formula because
they are not disaster states. In the following we focus on the
single disaster state. The numerical values λ = 5 sec−1, μ =
0.3 sec−1, 1/γ = 500 sec and 1/τ = 10 sec are taken from
[3]; we do not discuss whether these values are reasonable or
not.
Figure 3 shows the probability that has to be compared
with the probability bound p when checking the recoverability
formula with time bound t. It is the result of a transient
analysis of a transformed version of the CTMC model, ac-
cording to the model checking procedure for time-bounded
until defined in [12]. The probability depends non-trivially on
t and approaches 1 for t →∞. For points (t, p) on and below
the curve, the survivability formula holds in the disaster state.
Hence, if we take, e.g., p = 95% and choose t = 600 sec
(5 minutes), the disaster state (and consequently the complete
system) is survivable. All points above the curve represent time
bound/probability pairs for which the system is not survivable,
e.g., for p = 90% and t = 300 sec.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 720 660 600 540 480 420 360 300 240 180 120 60
p
t (sec)
(600,0.95)
(300,0.9)
system is not survivable system is survivable
Fig. 3. Results for survivability formula (2): probability of recovering from
the single disaster state before time t.
B. ROOD models: long-run survivability
In a ROOD model, the occurrence of disasters is explicitely
modelled by transitions leading into disaster states. Because
of the stochastic nature of the model, they occur randomly.
We can check the survivability formula (1) for all states
of a ROOD model as we do for GOOD models. For the
case that not all states are survivable, ROOD models support
a different notion of survivability. We define the long-run
survivability as the fraction of time the system resides in
survivable states when working in steady-state. A system
model complies with a level l ∈ [0, 1] of long-run survivability
if the accumulated steady-state probability of survivable states
is at least l. Phrased as a CSL formula this becomes
long run survivability ≡ S≥l(survivability).
Note that ROOD models are a special type of availability
models [9], and, as such, suitable for this purpose.
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However, a question arising when following the ROOD ap-
proach is how to determine an appropriate rate for the disaster
transitions. Disasters are absolutely rare events, much more
rare than single component failures, so it will often not be
possible to accomplish measurements that provide an adequate
rate. It is even questionable if it makes sense to introduce
disaster transitions into the model at all. Furthermore, it is not
obvious, how to introduce disaster transitions in case there are
several disaster states. Even if we have found a reasonable rate
for disasters, it will in general be very small in comparison to
other rates in the system. This discrepancy imposes numerical
difficulties when applying the model checking algorithms.
Employing ROOD models also foils the basic idea behind
model checking. Model checking allows us to take an existing
model of an arbitrary system, that reflects the mechanisms that
should provide survivability, e.g., redundancy. The survivabil-
ity measure is specified separately from the model, in terms of
a formula in an appropriate logic. Automated tools then check
the validity of the formula. We do not have to alter the model
to support the measure. In contrast, a ROOD model is tailored
specifically to support the evaluation of long-run survivability.
We think that the ROOD approach is not suitable for the
evaluation of survivability in the presence of catastrophic
disasters. Considering the difficulties in designing a suitable
model we decide not to follow this approach any further and
concentrate on GOOD models.
C. Different disasters & levels of service
The definition of survivability explicitly allows several
predefined service levels and is also not restricted to one type
of disaster.
One might easily imagine a scenario where different disas-
ters have different impact on the system. For a “mild” disaster
we want the system to return to full service in a very short
period of time. For a severe disaster we could require recovery
to a medium service level quickly but allow a much longer
interval for full recovery. In the following we formalise a
survivability specification where these aspects are taken into
account.
Let Disasters be a set of CSL formulas describing the
different grades of disaster impact we are going to explore
for a given model. The disaster formula in Section IV-A
would be one element of such a set.
Let Service Levels be a set of CSL formulas describing
different levels of service. Again, the service formula in
Section IV-A would be one element of this set.
A bound function B : Disasters×Service Levels → (R≥0∪
{∞}× [0, 1]) indicates the time bound and probability bound
for recovery from the different disasters to the different service
levels. We might set the time allowed for recovery to 0. In
this case the system must provide some service even in the
presence of a disaster. Using the value ∞ (for the time bound)
indicates that we require the system to recover eventually but
not within a given time.
To complete it all, the tuple (Disasters, Service Levels, B)
comprises a survivability specification. Given such a surviv-
ability specification, each pair of disaster and service formula
generates a CSL survivability formula (1). A system is sur-
vivable according to the survivability specification if its states
satisfy each of the generated survivability formulas. We show
this use in the next section.
V. CASE STUDY: A REPLICATED FILE SYSTEM
To show the feasibility of our approach, we evaluate the
survivability of a distributed file system with replicated data.
Our model of this file system is inspired by the description
of the Google file system [17]. Even though the Google
search engine is not vitally important, we all appreciate the
promptness of its service. A substantial part of the Google
services is made possible through the underlying file system.
The Google file system is a scalable distributed file system
for large distributed data-intensive applications. It is especially
designed to run on inexpensive commodity hardware for which
failures are thought to be the norm rather than the exception.
Remarkable is also its specialisation in the handling of very
large (multiple GB) files.
In the following we describe the design of the file system.
We construct a generalised stochastic Petri net (GSPN) model
from which a CTMC model is generated automatically. We
define different disaster and service levels as CSL formulas.
Instead of checking just one survivability specification, we
evaluate the conditions under which the file system survives
the different disasters.
A. System description
Files are divided into evenly sized chunks of 64 MB. Several
replicas (usually three) of these chunks reside on the disks of
a collection of so-called chunk servers. A client interacts with
the Google file system by first accessing the single master
computer that keeps a hashing table for the locations of all
replicas of a chunk. In a second step, the client either reads one
replica (usually the one residing on the closest chunk server)
or initiates a chain of updates to all replicas. The data transfer
is directly done between client and chunk servers, the master
is not further involved.
The master monitors the chunk servers with regular Heart-
Beat messages. If it detects the failure of a chunk server, it
will re-replicate the chunks that have been lost. Both, master
and chunk servers, are designed to recover really fast if there is
any software problem. A restart of the corresponding processes
takes just a couple of seconds. In case of a severe master
failure, another machine will soon take over. The chunk servers
are cheap commodity PCs. The designers of the file system
assumed that component failures occur frequently. A software
restart is – as it was the case for the master – a matter of
seconds. Replacing failed hardware is not urgent, since the
file system takes care of the lost data.
B. GSPN Model
In the following we describe a GSPN modelling the Google
file system. Our model focuses on the life cycle of a single
chunk but also accounts for the load imposed by the entirety
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Fig. 4. GSPN for the Google replicated fi le system
of all chunks. We took inspiration from the GSPN model of
a replicated file system with voting in [19].
The master is modelled by the places and transitions in the
upper part of Figure 4. Its places are prefixed with the upper-
case letter M, its transitions with the lowercase letter m. The
master is in working mode, if a token resides in place M up.
Transition m fail indicates a failure of the master. Firing of
immediate transition m soft implies that the failure is to be
repaired by a simple software restart, modelled by transition
m soft repair. If transition m hard fires, the hardware has
failed and repair is modelled by transition m hard repair. If
the master is up, transition replicate models the replication
process of chunks that have previously resided on a now failed
chunk server.
Tokens in the two places in the middle of Figure 4 represent
the replicas of a single chunk. A token in place R present
stands for an existing replica on a working chunk server.
Tokens in place R lost are replicas that were destroyed during
the failure of a chunk server. They are re-replicated by the
master via the replicate transition.
The lower part of the GSPN in Figure 4 represents the
status of the chunk servers. The total number of chunk servers
is M . Place C up contains one token for each chunk server
in working mode. Failure of chunk servers is modelled by
transition c fail. The immediate transitions destroy and
keep form a probabilistic switch deciding whether the failing
chunk server held one of the explicitly modelled replicas
or not. The probabilities for these immediate transitions are
determined by the ratio of the number of active replicas and
the number of operational chunk servers:
p(destroy) =
#R present
#C up
, p(keep) = 1− p(destroy).
Note that the weighting probabilities are to be determined be-
fore transition c fail fires because the intermediate marking
(with a token in C1) is vanishing. Transitions c soft and
c hard decide whether it has been a software or a hardware
fault. Repair is modelled by transitions c soft repair and
c hard repair respectively. A software restart requires no
further human interaction and is therefore performed simulta-
neously for all failed chunk servers (infinite server semantics).
Hardware failures are solved one by one.
The restoration of replicas depends on several details. First
of all, the master has to be in working mode. Having two
replicas of the same chunk on one chunk server has no
advantages, so the number of chunk servers must exceed the
number of already existing replicas. Finally, we take into
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TABLE I
RATES, PROBABILITIES AND ENABLING CONDITIONS OF TRANSITIONS.
transition rate (min−1) probability enabling condition
m fail 0.0005
m soft repair #M soft down · 12
m hard repair 6.0
c fail 0.05
c soft repair #C soft down · 12
c hard repair 1.0
replicate
20.0 if #R present > 0
2.0 if #R present = 0
(#C up > #R present) and
(#C up · S ≥ (#R present + 1) ·N)
m soft 0.95
m hard 0.05
c soft 0.95
c hard 0.05
destroy
#R present
#C up
keep 1− #R present
#C up
account that the explicitly modelled chunk is not the only one
in the file system. We introduce two additional parameters
of the system. The storage capacity S of a chunk server is
the maximum number of chunks it can store on its disks.
With N we denote the total number of chunks handled by the
file system. The file system supports three replicas of every
chunk if the number of unique chunk servers M ≥ 3N/S.
For the distinguished chunk we define a worst case scenario:
the restoration of the kth replica is only possible, if there
are already k replicas of all other chunks. Since we do not
model explicitly the majority of the chunks, we approximate
this behaviour by enabling the replicate transition only if
#C up · S ≥ (#R present+ 1) ·N,
that is, if the available storage capacity is sufficient for
(#R present+1) replicas of all N chunks. Thus we avoid the
explicit modelling of the status of all chunks and their replicas,
which would lead to a state space of intractable size. The
transition replicate has a marking-dependent rate: if there
are still replicas on working servers, e.g., #R present > 0,
replication is done quickly. If the chunk was lost completely
(#R present = 0), the chunk has to be rebuild from external
sources which takes a much longer time.
The rates and probabilities assigned to transitions (cf. Table
I) are all educated guesses made on the basis of [17].
The underlying labelled CTMC: The GSPN for the file
system is described in a variant of CSPL, which also allows the
specification of marking-dependent atomic propositions. The
state space generation code of [20] has been used to derive the
labelled CTMC automatically from the GSPN specification.
We now derive an explicit expression for the number of
tangible states as a function of the number of chunk servers
M . First considering only the places of the master part, there
are 3 different markings. For the replica part, there are just four
different markings. Concerning just the chunk-server places,
there are 12 (M +1)(M +2) different markings. However, not
all of these comprise valid overall system states: markings
where the number of working chunk servers is smaller than
the number of existing replicas (#C up < #R present) are
not valid. The total number of such markings is 18M + 6.
Hence, the total number of states equals
|S| = 3 · 4 ·
1
2
(M + 1)(M + 2)− (18M + 6) = 6(M 2 + 1).
Atomic propositions are defined for the states of the CTMC
(= tangible markings) by making statements about the number
of tokens in a place [13]. For example, a marking is labelled
(#M up = 1)
whenever there is a single token in place M up. We allow
arbitrary comparisons (<,≤,=,≥, >).
C. Survivability Specification
Disasters: We differentiate six levels of disaster, depend-
ing on the number of chunk servers failed and the type of
failure.
• The master has failed in all disaster circumstances.
• If 25–50% of the chunk servers are affected we call it a
light disaster, for 50–75% a medium and for 75–100% a
severe disaster. The remaining chunk servers are working.
• We assume that there are either only software failures of
each affected computer or only hardware failures.
We do not deal with mixed disasters, where both software
and hardware failures have occurred. The event provoking a
disaster is thought to affect either the hardware or the software
of the file system. However, a mixed disaster is always worse
than a pure hardware disaster. Results for hardware disasters
consequently hold for mixed disasters as well.
Consider a “light software disaster”. The formula
master software failure ≡ (#M soft down = 1)
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holds if the master has failed because of a software problem.
The formula
c light software failure ≡ (#C soft down >
M
4
)
∧ (#C soft down ≤
M
2
)
∧ (#C hard down = 0)
holds in states where between 25% and 50% of the chunk
servers have failed because of software reasons and the rest
of the chunk servers is working properly. The corresponding
disaster states are described as:
light software disaster ≡ master software failure
∧ c light software failure
The other elements of the disaster set
Disasters = { light software disaster,
medium software disaster,
severe software disaster,
light hardware disaster,
medium hardware disaster,
severe hardware disaster }
are specified similarly.
Service levels: Concerning the single modelled chunk, we
can only talk of service if there is at least one replica left. The
number of existing replicas determines also the performance
of the file system when handling a request. So, we define
three levels of service, depending on the number of available
replicas. The master has to be in working mode in either case.
As CSL formulas:
master working ≡ (#M up = 1)
at least 1 replica ≡ (#R present ≥ 1)
service level 1 ≡ master working
∧ at least 1 replica.
The other service levels in
Services = { service level 1,
service level 2,
service level 3 }
are specified in the same manner.
D. Survivability Evaluation
In [17], a setup of the file system with 1000 chunk servers
and a total of 300 TB disk space is mentioned, thus implying
300 GB storage per chunk server. We therefore choose to set
the storage capacity of each chunk server to S = 5000 replicas,
which amounts to 5000 ·64 MB/chunk = 312.5 GB per chunk
server. The GSPN model for the file system with 1000 chunk
servers generates a CTMC with about 6 million states. Even
though it is in general possible to evaluate CSL formulas via
transient solution for a system of this size [21], for illustrative
reasons we restrict the number of chunk servers to M = 80.
The total number of chunks is taken to be N = 100000, so
that in total 3 · N = 300000 replicas have to be stored. The
CTMC generated from the GSPN model with these parameters
has 38406 states and 260885 transitions.
The six disaster types and three service levels generate
a total of 18 survivability formulas as stated in (1). For a
complete survivability specification (cf. Sec. IV-C), we need
to identify the time and probability bounds B(·, ·) for each
disaster/service pair.
We do not check a single survivability specification here,
but rather evaluate in general what types of survivability
specifications are satisfied. Since there are always multiple
disaster states, for each disaster/service pair, we calculate the
minimum probability over all disaster states to recover within
time t. Only if this minimum probability is above the specified
probability threshold, all of the disaster states are survivable.
All evaluations have been made using proprietary imple-
mentations of the CSL model checking algorithms.
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Fig. 5. The minimum probability of recovering within t minutes from
disaster soft light for the three different service levels
Figure 5 shows the minimum probability of recovering
in time for different times t starting from a state
that satisfies disaster soft light. Any survivability
specification where the bound function B maps
(disaster soft light, service level i) to a pair
(t, p) below the corresponding curve, is satisfied
by the system (concerning only this disaster). If
B(disaster soft light, service level i) is above
the corresponding curve, the system cannot be survivable.
Software failures of multiple chunk servers are repaired by
restarting all affected computers simultaneously. The average
time needed for a restart is only 5 sec. Hence, the time to
recover depends mainly on the master to return to service fol-
lowed by the restoration of the replicas, and not on the restart
of the chunk servers. As a consequence, the numerical results
for disaster soft medium and disaster soft severe are
almost identical to the ones for disaster soft light. We
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therefore omit a graph of the minimum probabilities of recov-
ering in time for the medium and severe software disaster.
Figure 6 shows the minimum probability over all disaster
states of recovering in time after the different hardware disas-
ters, again for the three service levels. Again, if the bound
function B has values below the corresponding curve, all
states satisfy this part of the survivability specification. For
values above the curves, there are disaster states that do not
satisfy the survivability specification, i.e., for these values the
system is not survivable. Note that the x-axes in Figure 6 have
different scales. This different scaling makes that the effect of
probability mass “moving to the right” when going to higher
service levels (that is, going from (a) to (c)) appears less strong
than it is!
An example of a bound function B for which the model of
the Google file system is survivable is given in Table II. Since
recoverability is almost independent of the grade of a software
disaster, time and probability bounds are chosen to be the same
for one of the service levels and all three software disasters.
All time/probability pairs are situated below the corresponding
curves in Figure 5. For light and medium hardware disasters,
recovery to service level 1 is likely to take place in a couple
of minutes. For a severe hardware disaster, recovery takes
substantially longer (cf. Figure 6(a)). In case of service level
2 and 3, recovery from severe hardware disasters takes even
more time. In these cases, the survivability specification only
requires the system to recover at all, but does not state a finite
time bound.
VI. CONCLUSION
Previously proposed intuitive definitions of survivability
have focused on the ability to recover from disastrous cir-
cumstances. The logic CSL gives us the means to formulate
a precise survivability specification, thereby adhering to the
intuitive definition. A system is called survivable if all of its
states satisfy the survivability formula. For a CTMC model,
we can apply automatic model checking algorithms. The only
work that has to be done manually is the building of a suitable
model (we prefer GOOD models) and the specification of the
ingredients of the survivability formula. CSL model checking
tools automatically accomplish the actual survivability eval-
uation. Even though the evaluation boils down to a simple
transient analysis of a transformed CTMC, we think it is
worth using the CSL framework, as it allows for an elegant,
consistent and comparable specification and evaluation of
survivability.
Several other measures can be computed for CTMC models.
We relate a few of them to the survivability measure. Avail-
ability [22] is the ability of a system to deliver a predefined
service at any instant of time. Long-run survivability is defined
as the availability of survivable states. Survivable states are
characterised by recoverability (return to service in a given
time) after the occurrence of a disaster. Reliability [23] is
the ability to deliver uninterrupted service for a specified
time. This measure is more suitable to evaluate the defence
mechanisms of a system against disasters. Dependability is a
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Fig. 6. The minimum probability of recovering within time t from the
different hardware disasters to the service levels 1, 2 and 3
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TABLE II
BOUND FUNCTION B : Disasters× Services → R≥0 ∪ {∞} × [0, 1] FOR SURVIVABILITY SPECIFICATION
service level 1 service level 2 service level 3
disaster soft light (1.6, 0.95) (1.8, 0.95) (2.0, 0.95)
disaster soft medium (1.6, 0.95) (1.8, 0.95) (2.0, 0.95)
disaster soft severe (1.6, 0.95) (1.8, 0.95) (2.0, 0.95)
disaster hard light (1.2, 0.8) (2.0, 0.8) (30, 0.8)
disaster hard medium (2.0, 0.8) (30, 0.8) (∞, 1.0)
disaster hard severe (25, 0.8) (∞, 1.0) (∞, 1.0)
more general concept that includes, among others, availability
and reliability [24]. One can see survivability as one possible
additional constituent of dependability.
We showed the complete survivability evaluation process for
a replicated file system that exhibits essentially the behaviour
of the Google file system. We could check whether a given
survivability specification is satisfied by the file system or not.
We also showed how to indicate in detail the conditions under
which the system is survivable.
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